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1.2.2.2 A Working HypothesisSome, like Berkeley above, would say we impose this structure on reality. Perhaps this structure is not real, but more a reflection of our limited human mental ability. Though it might be nice to resolve whether this structure is real or not, we can get by just as well without actually knowing the answer. If we adopt this structure we have a way to understand and deal with or respond to universe, whether it ultimately reflects reality or not. Without it we would seem to be lost. As discussed in section 1.2.7 this conclusion doesn’t require us to be determinists, idealists or dualists. We must avoid the error of assuming more than is warranted. Though we can't have a conversation without these assumptions, we can still question them, and we are not entitled to rely on them to make other, secondary, or even more remote conclusions. For instance, we already know that modern science has a very complex understanding of space and time and quantum entanglement involves complex notions of causality. Questions of fact, that science can resolve better than philosophy, must be left to the scientists. Causality can be tricky. The ancient Greek Aristotle originally defined a number of different possible kinds of cause: · A material cause is a change due to the nature of the substance involved, be it stone, wood, or metal. Fire, for example, carries things upwards, unless stopped from doing so. · A formal cause relates to the shape of a thing or its ideal nature (Platonic form). To Aristotle the ratio 2 to 1 explains octaves in music, in which frequencies are doubled or halved. · A final cause, or teleological explanation, refers to the end of a causal chain, pulling the changes towards it. A seed might be pulled into a tree. A person’s action may be directed to achieving some goal. Some theists believe god is pulling the world towards a final end. It turns out that these possible kinds of cause are no longer useful: they don't help to explain things. · Aristotle’s efficient cause is what makes the event happen. This is the only kind of cause now recognised in science. But our initial assumption or imposition of cause onto reality does not have to resolve this issue. We attempt to summarise this as follows: 1.2.2.2 We cannot as yet in our philosophical analysis have firm beliefs about the nature of space and time. Nor do we have grounds to assume every event has a cause: some may be random or the link between cause and effect may be probabilistic. Nor does adopting that there is some agency in the universe, that some things appear ‘move by themselves’, or ‘have thoughts’ imply anything about the fundamental nature of reality. more (later) So now we can consider perception.
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