1.5.10.1 Free Will and Choice

Version 1.0 October 2022                             (Previous Version)

In Chapter 1 on Epistemology, especially section 1.1.3, we present what we have called the Dilemma of Truth.  The conclusion stated there is as follows:

We live with the dilemma that:

●   Our beliefs are either caused by the laws of nature or God, or they are not, in which case they are arbitrary or chaotic, so our beliefs are not necessarily true.

But …

●   We still in fact agree that some things are factually wrong and some actions are morally wrong: we all take actions based on specific beliefs about the world.

We all believe in and seek the Truth, despite our choices being caused or chaotic.  We must acknowledge the uncertainty in the statement and all beliefs we hold.

Chapter 1.1 presents this dilemma in the context of determining whether we can ever know the truth.  Even if we put aside fundamental philosophical or religious beliefs, can we determine whether our ordinary day to day beliefs about the world are true?  Having chosen to value Truth, in Chapter 1.2 we accept that we can discuss what is true in reality, ie in our shared notion of a public reality.  Following that, in Chapter 1.3 we conclude that there is no reason to believe in God(s) or the supernatural, and in practice there are good reasons NOT to do that.   

Chapter 1.4 on Minds and Free Will takes up the discussion of causality or chaos versus choice.  In philosophy the subject is called Free Will and Determinism.  Even if we are uncertain about the meaning of the word, we say we actually make choices, and in that discussion we choose to live, to value Life, despite life being short, that there is no afterlife, and that we are insignificant compared to the vast scale of the universe. 

The nature of choice is particularly relevant to making core ethical value choices, especially Responsibility, because this core value especially involves social controls and coercion.  Because we value Love (Chapter 1.5 Section 8), we aim to avoid causing harm or suffering and promote happiness or well-being, and coercive social controls could be seen as contrary to that aim.  Because we value Equality (Chapter 1.5 Section 9), we aim to treat people as equals in some respects, in particular that everyone’s joy or suffering should be treated as equally significant when making value choices; and again coercive social controls could be seen as contrary to that aim.  So we need to get it right.

Each time we propose choosing a core value, we refer to this dilemma, acknowledging that the nature of choice involves an apparent contradiction: that it is caused or chaotic yet we believe choice is real.

We can rephrase our fundamental Dilemma to show how it applies to making choices, and add the consequent that choices not made freely are not blameworthy:

We live with the dilemma that:

●   Our ethical choices are either caused by the laws of nature or God, or they are not,

in which case they are arbitrary or chaotic,

so our choices are not necessarily made “freely�,

so we cannot be blamed for actions we have no control of;

But …

●   We still make ethical choices, “believingâ€� that the act of choosing is real,

that we are agents capable of making the choice, and

that some choices are better or worse than others, based on our beliefs about the world.

We all make ethical choices, despite our choices being caused or chaotic.  We must acknowledge the uncertainty that underlies those choices.

The central issue so far as society is concerned is whether we can blame individuals for the mistakes they make – the harm they cause – and apply coercive social controls, including various forms of punishment – socially sanctioned suffering – if we can't make ethical choices of our own free will. 

As you would expect in philosophy, there is no agreed answer or consensus in response to this issue. However there may be a trend towards accepting the reality of behavioural causation while clutching at straws to redefine free will, as though this actually solves the problem (because having free will means there is no apparent causal relationship between the situation we face and the choice we make).

●   Some accept that the universe is materialistic, made of matter and energy controlled by natural laws that are deterministic, or probabilistic (indeterminism), and that ethical decisions are impossible in this space/time.  But they assume that at a fundamental level morality is real, values are real, notions such as justice and the good are valid.  So they conclude there must be a non-material world, some supernatural existence, from which these things come.  They take it as axiomatic that ethical decisions are possible: they simply made independently of the natural world and the laws of nature.  This is an unnecessary and unhelpful hypothesis.  We address this issue in earlier chapters, on Metaphysics (1.2), Theology (1.3) and Mind (1.4).  Firstly, even if we accept that morality is real and ethical decisions are possible, we can (and do) explain how this can occur without having to appeal to the supernatural.  Secondly, even if this supernatural world did allow ‘free will’ to apply, if ethical decisions are not controlled by some principles, however ethereal, sacred or transcendent, then they are made in unprincipled ways, without guidelines or any surety, those decisions from our perspective seem to be random!  If they are not random, then we should be able to elucidate the guiding principles. Thirdly, there needs to be communication between the material world and the supernatural world so that the ethical decision can be made on the basis of the real world facts and then passed back to physical brain that controls the ethically inspired behaviour.  Some people talk about psychons, comparable to the force particles of modern physics (gluons, W and Z bosons, and photons).  This mooted interaction raises more problems than it solves.  Fourthly, we have concluded that belief in a supernatural world does not help with determining our values or ethical guidelines.  We can (and do) explain value, ethics, meaning and purpose without appealing to the supernatural.

●   Some say that if we have no free will then all our choices are determined.  Hence moral choices are impossible, so there is no good or bad, just raw nature.  This is called hard determinism. It assumes a simplistic billiard ball model of reality based on physics as it was understood around 1900 CE.  Since then we have learnt about quantum physics. 

●   Quantum physics has been repeatedly confirmed as correct.  It says that many events, especially at the subatomic level, are not determined, but occur randomly, at random times, or not at all.  It is likely that quantum physical effects don’t impact how the neurons in our brains react, and we believe these neurons are responsible for perception, memory and action, and hence our behaviour. But there is a possibility that quantum effects do impact on our behaviour, which would introduce a degree of randomness in our choices, which is called indeterminism, or more colourfully, chaos.  Some say this also implies that moral choice is impossible, so there is still no good or bad.

●   Some people clutch at straws and hope that that in the situations where quantum effects apply, when the outcome is not determined, there is room for free will to apply.  Firstly, if it did apply, we would expect some outcomes to NOT be random, and this has never been found at the quantum level.  Secondly the quantum level applies to subatomic interactions, which seem to be well below the level of neuronal activity.  Thirdly, while quantum effects are random, mathematical laws apply that show that at a higher level the outcome of many random events can be reliably predicted.  (For a simple example, if we flip a coin that randomly comes up heads or tails, with a 50:50 chance of either outcome, a few times we cannot predict the outcome, but if we flip it a million times we can reliably predict the outcome will be very close to 500,000 heads and 500,000 tails.  Casinos bank on this kind of mathematics.)  Fourthly, there is no real explanation of how ‘free will’ having an effect on certain quantum events in our brains can significantly alter conscious ethical decisions.  Fifthly, there is no explanation of why ‘free will’ would affect the quantum events related to ethical choices and not outcomes outside our consciousness – such as rocks and so forth.  (To be consistent on this possibility, some people have concluded that all matter, rocks included, have some level or consciousness or free will, but this is unhelpful.)

●   Some people fully accept that at subatomic, atomic and molecular levels there is no room for free will, and events are either determinate or indeterminate (caused or chaotic).  Within our bodies there are also causal chains that effectively impose actions that we have no control over – extreme thirst or extreme pain forces us to take action to fix that problem, to the exclusion of all other potential actions.  Even at a conscious level we may be forced to make decisions that are effectively beyond our control – a gun at your head persuades you to comply with the gunman’s requests, a threat of violence against your children may make you even more helpless to resist. 

*    But, they say, at a conscious level there is room for real choices, when you are NOT driven by bodily needs, or external threats, or irresistible enticements, or psychotic delusions: then you can make a choice “of your own free will�.  This is a version of compatibilism, the notion that free will is compatible with determinism and/or indeterminism. To reiterate, this approach accepts that the laws of physics and chemistry control all the neurons in your brain, and the laws (many of which we don't know) of neurophysiology and psychology and other body and brain sciences still apply.

*    Firstly, and most importantly this approach does not really explain how free will and determinism or indeterminism are compatible, it just redefines what is meant by free will, to the point that a decision made “of your own free will� is essentially defined as a decision for which we know no apparent cause, ie there is no physical, chemical, psychological or sociological explanation.  Free will in this scenario is making a choice with no known cause, so, like the god of the gaps, the range of choices where free will supposedly applies will be diminished as the neurosciences advance and we can explain behaviour better. 

*    Secondly, this approach still does not provide a basis for decisions made of our own free will.  There is no marking scheme, selection criteria, or decision tree.  If an individual decides to be nice to someone, then in hindsight we may say this due to that individual being altruistic, or whatever.  If they decided to be nasty, in hindsight we might say they were driven at that time by selfish urges.  If we tried to be predictive, rather than use hindsight, then our predictions would be based on past behaviour and would not be certain: they would be probabilistic.  If we knew ‘this person is nice to most people, most of the time’ we could predict they would probably be nice once again.  Does that help with understanding free will?  Probably not. 

*    Thirdly, this approach doesn’t take away our dilemma: we still have concerns about the nature of choice, especially ethical choices; we still have the challenge of applying potentially coercive social controls – socially sanctioned suffering – when we also value Love (minimizing harm and suffering) and Equality (taking everyone’s suffering and joy into account).  We also still are aware of the uncertainty and the apparently superficial (but not really) arbitrary nature of all our core values, especially our core ethical choice of Responsibility.